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Every now and then, I enjoy watching nature documentaries, and in particular those by 
Jacques Cousteau, the famous French oceanologist. There is an episode where —if I 
remember correctly— part of the coast of Somalia is explored. Cousteau’s divers are at the 
beach, fully equipped and ready to explore the waters. This to the great amusement of the 
local population; to the locals, the creatures on the beach must be an unfamiliar species of 
dolphins: they have the same smooth skin and general appearance, despite the fact that they 
have limbs and are able to walk. Nonetheless, dolphins they must be! 
We all experience the desire to characterize unfamiliar phenomena in terms or 
categories we think we understand or recognize; this makes the unexpected manageable. As 
the example above shows, this desire can be so seductive that it can lead to deception. As far 
as comparative law is concerned, this can be quite a problem. Is there a way to overcome this 
seduction? This is a question I want to deal with in this chapter, and I will build on a debate 
that took place in the 1960s in order to do so. But to be able to do this, I will first need to start 




What is it that justifies comparative law as an independent discipline?2 This question is 
relevant, since comparison is inseparably connected with doing research in the humanities and 
social sciences—of either which the legal domain is a part.3 Nearly any claim we make as 
lawyers, as well as every distinction we draw, will implicitly or explicitly be set against 
something else. A legal arrangement can only be qualified as satisfactory or good because 
there is another arrangement by which it can be measured; such an arrangement is never good 
just in and of itself. When judges are looking for principles to help decide on an 
unprecedented or unregulated situation, they tend to rely on analogical reasoning, ie they 
apply a rule for a comparable situation, be it a real or hypothetical one, to the situation at 
hand. Also, ordering and classifying cases in a specific field or domain —call it the pursuit for 
consistency— is very much a comparative activity; it is an exercise which can only be done 
because there are a number of cases that can be situated against each other. Comparing, in 
other words, is a fundamental principle of legal research.4 It even provides the inevitable and 
                                                          
1 A previous version of this chapter was published in Dutch, as: ‘Eenvoud en verleidelijkheid: 
Rechtsvergelijkende analyse en taal van descriptie’ (2011) 60 Ars Aequi Maandblad 796-801. 
2 See also M Adams. ‘Doing What Doesn’t Come Naturally. On the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in M 
Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 229-240. 
3 On this, see for example B Bix, ‘Law as an Autonomous Discipline’ in P Cane and M Tushnet (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 975–87 and Ch McCrudden, ‘Legal 
Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 623–50. 
4 Also in this vein, VV Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ 
(2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 262. 
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inescapable frame of reference for scientific activity in the humanities and social sciences.5 
More generally and even stronger: ‘[t]hinking without comparison is unthinkable. And, in the 
absence of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research.’6 Therefore, it could 
be argued that there really is nothing very special about doing comparative law. To be sure, 
legal research has some distinctive features, but comparativeness is not one of them; that 
quality is part and parcel of all (legal) research. ‘[I]n major respects, comparative law is an 
instance of the more general form of legal research [which is hermeneutic, interpretative and 
institutional]. The way in which it attempts to reconstruct both the foreign and the 
researcher’s own legal systems is similar to general legal research on either of those 
systems.”7 
 If all this is true, what then could possibly justify, or be the point of, distinguishing 
comparative law from other kinds of legal research? Why not simply refer to what doing legal 
research amounts to, and then add a few words of warning on the choice of countries and so 
on? There must be more to be said on this, for why else would the phrase ‘comparative law’ 
proudly carry the term ‘comparative’ in its banner? If indeed it does not want to be dismissed 
as a pleonasm —‘Thinking about the law is by definition comparative, Silly!’— comparative 
law should at the very least pose some specific challenges other than the problems lawyers 
and legal researchers routinely face.8 
One of the main reasons there is something special or distinctive about doing 
comparative legal research, something that calls for a specific approach and specific methods, 
is that legal comparatists must, among other things, immerse themselves in a foreign and 
therefore strange legal culture. Such an ‘involved’ activity does not come naturally because 
legal comparatists have to deal with one or more legal cultures whose ‘language’ 
(metaphorically understood) they do not speak, ie cultures with different institutions and 
unexpressed codes; their own histories, ideologies and self-images; systems they have not 
normally been trained, educated or disciplined in, and with which they are therefore not 
naturally or intimately connected to. This process of trying to understand foreign or strange 
legal cultures (or some of their elements) with an eye for subsequent comparison, manifests 
particular problems because it goes far beyond mere fact-finding and the regular (ie national) 
way of legal interpretation, where one almost self-evidently engages the social context when 
determining the meaning of the law. The problems that the law addresses and the solutions 
                                                          
5 Knowing what I don’t know, I do not wish to make any statement in this chapter about what are called the 
positive or natural sciences. 
6 GE Swanson, ‘Frameworks for Comparative Research’ in I Vallier (ed), Comparative Methods in Sociology 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971) 141. Also quoted by VV Palmer ‘From Lerotholi to Lando’ 
(2005) 261. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz formulated the same view somewhat more subtly: ‘Santayana’s 
famous dictum that one compares only when one is unable to get to the heart of the matter seems to me … the 
precise reverse of the truth; it is through comparison, and of incomparables, that whatever heart we can actually 
get to is to be reached.’ C Geertz, Local Knowledge (New York, Basic Books, 1983) 233. More direct is J Hall, 
Comparative Law and Social Theory (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1963) 9: ‘[T]o be sapiens 
is to be a comparatist.’ 
7 J Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of 
Legal Research, 175 (Bell qualifies this statement, to the extent that he clearly recognizes that there are peculiar 
challenges to comparative law, especially in terms of having to make explicit, to a foreign audience, the broader 
social and cultural context and assumptions of a foreign legal systems or legal concepts). 
8 VV Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando’ 262–63, cf HP Glenn, ‘Aims of Comparative Law’ in JM Smits (ed), 
Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006) 59. 
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that it intends to provide are very much connected to the socio-cultural environment from 
which these problems and solutions arise, and the comparatist should engage with this 
environment. This specific problem justifies the existence of the research discipline known as 
comparative law. Furthermore, the repeated assertion that comparative law is not an area of 
law seems to support this point.9 In any case, thorough understanding and comprehensive 
description of a foreign legal cultures —in the manner described above— indeed raises 




In the 1960s, a debate took place that was related to the issue described in the previous 
section: which conceptual framework ought to be used to describe a foreign legal culture (or 
legal system10)? How are the characteristics of the foreign system represented most 
efficiently? The initiation for the debate was a study by Max Gluckman, a South-African legal 
anthropologist, about the process of dispute resolution in the Barotse-tribe in former 
Northern-Rhodesia (today known as Zambia).11 Gluckman opted for a conceptual framework, 
based first and foremost on English law, and secondly on Roman-Dutch law. ‘I consider that 
very many of [the Barotse legal] concepts can, without distortion after careful and perhaps 
lengthy description and discussion, be given English equivalents (…).’12 
  As was to be expected, Gluckman’s methods received criticism, most notably from 
fellow anthropologist Paul Bohannan: the terminology of English law and Roman-Dutch law 
might well be suited to the description of the English and South African legal systems, but 
certainly not for the description of the ‘folk law’ of an African tribe.13 According to 
Bohannan, these legal systems were to be described in the native terms and categories that 
evoked their individuality. In other words, they should not be forced onto the Procrustean bed 
                                                          
9 VV Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando’ 262-63. See also WJ Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: a Theoretical 
Framework’ (1974) 23 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 486-489. All this led Kahn-Freud to quip 
that there is no such thing as comparative law: ‘The trouble is that the subject (...) has by common consent the 
somewhat unusual characteristic that it does not exist.’ O. Kahn-Freud, ‘Comparative Law as an Academic 
Subject’ (1966), 81 Law Quarterly Review, 41. Part of Kahn-Freud’s observation is due to the somewhat 
established and misleading English terminology – ‘comparative law’. This suggests that there is in fact a separate 
legal domain. This problem does not exist in Dutch (rechtsvergelijking), nor in German (Rechtsvergleichung). In 
both languages, the term refers to an activity: comparing law. French has the same ‘problem’ as English: ‘droit 
comparé’. 
10 In this text, I will treat terms such as legal culture, system, etc., as synonymous, referring to these norm 
constellations that are foreign to that of a comparatist. This applies to systems that are physically or culturally 
close to ours (within Europe, for example) or far away. For the problems concerning the term legal culture, see 
D. Nelken, ‘Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture’, in E Örücü and D Nelken (eds.), Comparative 
Law. A Handbook (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 109-132. 
11 M Gluckman, The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1967) (second 
edition, originally published in 1965 as ‘Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence at Yale Law School’ ); M Gluckman, 
‘Reappraisal’ in The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1967) (first edition 1955) en M. Gluckman, ‘Concepts in the Comparative Study of 
Tribal Law’ in L Nader (ed.), Law in Culture and Society (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997) 349-
373. See also SF Moore, ‘Comparative Studies’, in L Nader (ed.), Law in Culture and Society 341-346. 
12 M Gluckman, The Judicial Process 380-381. 
13 P Bohannan, ‘Review of The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence’ (1967) 36 Kroeber Anthropological Society 




of the principles and concepts of a different legal culture. This would only lead to tunnel 
vision and confusion because the foreign legal culture would then be viewed and understood 
as a function of this different legal culture. ‘[I]t simulates understanding through the use of a 
familiar word. Such simulation leads —almost inevitably, I think— to an assumption of 
comparability of everything called by the same word – and this is a difficulty that is almost 
impossible to correct.’14 
  Gluckman appeared to only agree in part with this criticism.15 Indeed, he too believed 
that a legal anthropologist should strive to describe the legal system at issue in a way that 
would reflect its individual character. And where there would be no reasonable equivalent of 
the original (ie African) terminology available, then the original terminology would prevail. 
However, in cases where there was an equivalent, he did not consider it a problem to use – in 
his case – English or Roman law terminology; if necessary however with a comprehensive 
description of the original Barotse concept. In fact, he preferred such an approach. ‘[I]t seems 
to me that the refinements of English, and in general European, jurisprudence provide us with 
a more suitable vocabulary than do the languages of tribal law.’16 As a result, and with regard 
to the concept of ‘ownership’, he was prepared to state that 
 
I consider that when writing in English, the use of the English equivalent term, general and 
multiferential in its common-sense meaning, brings out implications in the English 
meaning of “owner” as well as perhaps a significant core of similarity in the Barotse 
meaning of mung’a. The alternative in the extreme is to make communication 
impossible.’17 
 
Gluckman argued that it would not only be possible to communicate more effectively about a 
foreign system using this familiar —ie English and Roman-Dutch— terminology, but that this 
would be even more effective in revealing the similarities and differences between the legal 
systems researched. 
  In this respect, the difference in opinion between Gluckman and Bohannan seemed to 
be a matter of nuance and taste. It is even possible to argue that they were both partially right, 
but that Gluckman was the more pragmatic of the two: in practice it is impossible to 
objectively describe a foreign system, and a language of communication is indispensable. 
Gluckman therefore believed that one should be able to use a language that is recognisable for 
the stranger, especially a language that allowed the making of subtle distinctions. Bohannan 
argued that such a research strategy would inevitably lead to confusion and tunnel vision 
(bias) and that this should be avoided at all costs. It seemed as though both Gluckman and 





                                                          
14 P Bohannan, ‘Etnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology’ 403. 
15 M Gluckman, ‘Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal Law’ 349-373. 
16 ibid 367. 





There is however, I think, more to the story, and this is set against a background of differing 
views concerning the goals of legal anthropology and comparative law respectively. 
Gluckman was mainly interested in reaching a higher level of abstraction; he wanted to 
investigate whether some of the fundamentals of a specific legal system, in his case of the 
Barotse-tribe, also had a further-reaching and broader meaning. For Gluckman these 
fundamentals were potentially more than just incidental legal concepts, he viewed them as 
part of a larger question: what is the relation between the local legal concepts and the socio-
economic context of these concepts? He also wanted to be able to explore and explain that 
relation: ‘I am interested, like most social anthropologists, in specifying the folk conceptions 
of particular people as clearly as I can and then trying to explain why they are as they are, and 
how they differ from folk conceptions of others, in terms of social and economic 
background.’18 He was concerned with description as well as comparative analysis, no doubt 
taking to heart the statement that ‘he who knows one society, knows no society.’19 Bohannan, 
on the other hand, was primarily interested in describing and understanding the foreign legal 
system in and on its own terms, rather than comparing it. As Clifford Geertz had it: ‘“law,” 
here, there, or anywhere, is part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real.”20 21 Therefore, 
since each legal construct must and can be seen as a discrete epistemological construct, the 
differences between legal cultures is irreducible.22 As a result, it is, eg, ‘not possible for a 
civilian to think like a common-law lawyer.’23 Bohannan indeed believed that in the micro-
world of the legal conceptual framework of the Tiv, a Nigerian tribe he had investigated 
himself24, the whole organisation of the legal system could be found. Gluckman on the other 
hand looked at the concepts and principles of Barotse law as part of a larger (comparative) 
objective, whereas Bohannan was mostly interested in studying the (Tiv) concepts themselves 
                                                          
18 ibid 354. 
19 Attributed to Fahrenfort. Cited by A Köbben, ‘De vergelijkend-functionele methode in de volkenkunde’ [The 
comparative-functional method in anthropology], in A Köbben, Van primitieven tot medeburgers [From primitives 
to fellow citizens] (Van Gorcum, 1964) 24. 
20 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 
184 (I will not go into Geertz’ nuanced argumentation). 
21 Bohannan’s approach is in tune (not identical!) with what later got prominence as ‘difference theory.’ 
Specifically in comparative law it gained prominence after Frankenberg published his critique of functionalism à 
la Zweigert and Kotz. G Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal 411–55. For important nuances of functionalism, see J Husa, ‘Farewell to 
Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’ (2003) 67 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht 419–47. 
22 On all this, see R Caterina, ‘Comparative Law and the Cognitive Revolution’ (2003-2004) 78 Tulane Law 
Review 1506 (and surrounding pages). Caterina calls for a more empirical approach towards questions of 
difference and similarity between legal systems (in his case because cognitive sciences might cast doubt on a 
presumption of difference in comparative law: ‘Of course cultural diversity cannot be denied, and one merit of 
comparison is that it challenges old certidus. But must comparative lawyers (or anthropologists) delberately seek 
“astonishment”? Must they “purposefully privilege the identification of differences?” ‘ (1546, quoting Clifford 
Geertz and Pierre Legrand respectively). Also G Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or 
Differences?, in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006) 416. 
23 P Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1999) 64. 
24 See P Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv (Prospect Heights, Waveland Press, 1957). 
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because he considered them a reflection of the whole organization of the legal system.25 
Speaking about a foreign legal culture in terminology taken from a legal language unknown to 
that culture, ‘gives the illusion of getting somewhere.’26 The discussion between Gluckman 
and Bohannan appeared to be at cross-purposes because they both had a different research 
focus and research objective. 
In any case, and as far as I am concerned, comparative law should not only focus on 
understanding and describing the foreign legal system, but should also strive to obtain more 
general ideas that follow from the identified differences and similarities between the legal 
systems. As just mentioned, this was Gluckman’s objective, more than it was Bohannan’s. 
However, it is striking that many times comparative law limits itself to only describing a 
foreign legal system (and often does so in a rather sophisticated manner). If however we want 
to give the term ‘compare’ an independent meaning, by explicitly bringing information from 
the different legal systems together, by comparing them to each other and by discussing the 
relation between the systems at hand, more should be done. The question then becomes: What 
can we learn about the legal systems vis-à-vis each other, and do the reported similarities and 
differences fit in comparative and explanatory frameworks? 
For the purpose of description, Bohannan argued in favour of a completely neutral 
language, an ‘independent language without national home’ 27, because he felt that 
Gluckman’s conceptual framework was too closely connected to an existing system. A 
computer language like Fortan was an example of such an independent language. Bohannan 
realised that such an approach would be biased as well, but the bias would be more 
noticeable. ‘Obviously we cannot become biasless — rather, we must investigate our biases 
and institute controls for them. Obviously human beings cannot compare (or do anything else) 
without culture; rather we must control the logic of the culture of comparison.’28 Such a 
controlled comparison was to start from the inside and work towards the outside (not the other 
way around), according to Bohannan. The systems should be allowed to speak for themselves 
and they should be researched separately, based on their own terms and categories, and 
ultimately there should be an analytical framework – the aforementioned ‘independent 
language without national home’ – as the basis for the actual comparison. ‘This new language 
(…) is a logical structure of interrelated propositions about the working of society and 
culture.’29 For Bohannan, comparability and comparison were first and foremost a result of 
research, a conclusion, something that could only be found or postulated after the systems or 
cultures at issue had been fully explored, based on their individual characteristics. 
Comparability could certainly not be advanced by using a language of description that was 
intimately linked to a specific legal system. ‘Comparison must be done in a controlled way, 
with great awareness and sensitivity to the original meaning, and with a set of methods that 
allow us to utilize what we are doing toward some specific ends beyond merely buttressing a 
position.’30 
                                                          
25 SF Moore, ‘Comparative Studies’ 343. 
26 P Bohannan, ‘Etnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology’ 402 (my italics). 
27 P Bohannan, ‘Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology’ 416. 
28 ibid 416. 
29 ibid 416-417. 
30 ibid 410 (italics mine). 
 
 7 
Nevertheless, Bohannan would not dare to claim that Gluckman’s conclusions about 
the system of dispute settlement with the Barotse were wrong, he just believed that 
Gluckman’s method did not allow us to verify it. ‘Please note that I did not say that the 
[Barotse] and the English do not have fundamentally similar ideas, but only that by 
[Gluckmans] method of exposition there is no possible way for a reader to discover whether 
they have or not.’31 
Avoiding research bias is of course an important objective of any type of research, but 
Gluckman stated that we nevertheless should also consider the practical dimensions of 
comparative legal research: ‘It must be a very blinkered mind that, when an anthropologist 
speaks of contract in an African tribe, immediately thinks of the English or French or Roman-
Dutch or Roman contract. “Contract” has a general meaning of enforceable agreement; and 
one can use it – and must use it – to discuss the different conditions, forms, incidents, and 
remedies for breach of contract in various social conditions.’32 This is why he argued that 
 
[i]n a study of government one may use the word “legislature” to cover British 
Parliament, American Congress, German Bundestag and Reichstag, French Chambre 
des Députés, Japanese Diet, all for purposes of general discussion in order to draw 
attention to similarity while insisting on difference. Some word is necessary for 
purposes of general discussion. In discussing several systems of law, therefore, one 
may speak of ownership, contract, property, succession, marriage, betrothal, judge, 
decision, all to draw attention to a core of similitude while defining differences.33 
 
Open communication about new insights should indeed realistically be possible. Bohannan 
also appeared to acknowledge this when he wrote that the dispute with Gluckman ‘boils down 
to this question: is it more difficult for a reader to keep in mind a set of narrative terms or a set 
of glosses on English words (…)?’34 He nevertheless maintained that the second approach 
was too misleading. The fact of the matter, according to him, was that ‘good ethnography is 
hard to read (…). [E]very ethnographer owes it to himself, the people the studies, and his 





It seems clear to me that the anthropologist-ethnographer, as well as the legal comparatist, 
need to interpret foreign legal data as much as possible in their unique social context. The 
description of foreign legal systems or cultures should in other words do justice to its unique 
characteristics. Bohannan seemed very much aware of this and accepted its consequences 
without compromise. But since common sense is a virtue for the legal comparatist —as is 
                                                          
31 ibid 411. 
32 M Gluckman, ‘Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal Law’ 364. 
33 ibid. 
34 P Bohannan, ‘Etnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology’ 402. 
35 ibid 403. 
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sympathy for the reader!36— the real question is according to me whether using an existing 
language is indeed as disruptive as Bohannan took it to be. Is there indeed bias if familiar 
terminology —terminology stemming from one specific system— is used in comparative 
law? And does it really prohibit controlled comparison? 
As far as the last question is concerned, I do not think it does, in any case not 
necessarily so. This appreciation is confirmed by the fact that Bohannan, as an anthropologist 
and ethnographer, does not seem to fully realise that, in order to compare something, there 
needs to be similarity —to a certain degree— between the different jurisdictions regarding the 
matter at hand; a similarity that is represented in the research question and in the comparative 
conceptual framework which initiates the research. In any case, comparison is useless if there 
is no similarity between the systems or cultures. In this regard, the legal comparatist needs 
more specifically to postulate comparability and similarity at the start of the research. 
Comparability and similarity are not only a possible result of the research, as Bohannan seems 
to suggest, but are especially the necessary and presupposed starting points. Such a 
presumption of comparability is not completely unfounded but based on prior knowledge 
and/or preliminary investigation. At the very least, it is an educated guess, and this guess 
shows itself in the terminology on which the research question is framed and on which the 
research project builds. But of course, one has to realize that the true nature of the 
comparability/similarity of legal systems, including its conceptual framework and 
accompanying vocabulary, is only revealed by the research itself. It is important to note here 
that this implies that the focus of a research project needs to be adjusted repeatedly — 
stepping back and making a landscape picture (distance and similarity) and coming close and 
making close ups (difference). There is however no other way than to start with a broad 
conceptual framework and research question, based on a general view of the situation at issue 
and a presumption or appearance of similarity.37 In due course, more and more details will 
emerge as a result of an accurate description of the uniqueness of a system, including a 
willingness to re-characterize the original framework and vocabulary, the research question 
and the general situation. 
In my opinion, controlled comparison is a function of this permanent change in 
perspective; a continuous process and also part of the research procedure. Controlled 
comparison refines the research process permanently, even if you start with using a familiar 
conceptual framework.38 Since Bohannan was so focused on describing a foreign legal system 
from an almost exclusively micro or internal perspective, he did not seem to realize that it is 
in fact this permanent change in perspective which was essential to doing comparative law. 
This might well cater for solving the troubles he identifies on Gluckman’s approach. 
                                                          
36 See also, for a more extensive discussion, K Lemmens, ‘Comparative Law as an Act of Modesty: A Pragmatic 
and Realistic Approach to Comparative Legal Scholarship’, in M Adams and JA Bomhoff (eds.), Practice and 
Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
37 Even Pierre Legrand, the difference thinker par excellence, admits this. See P Legrand, ‘The Same and the 
Different’, in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 283. “(…) I accept that no comparison can be initiated without 
a comparatist taking the view that there is an apparent sameness between the objects of comparison, that they 
seem alike in at least one respect.” 
38 However, attention to case selection is a prerequisite, but this is something few lawyers pay attention to. See R 
Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2005) 53 The American Journal 
of Constitutional Law, 125-155. 
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Bohannan’s view may ultimately result in the description of a legal system being 
reduced to merely background information and deep context. By following his methodology 
you will run the risk of losing the notion that the principles of a legal system might transcend 
their local origin and have a further-reaching meaning than just their specific embeddedness.39 
Bohannan’s view may thus give rise to a solipsism that will in the end make comparison very 
difficult.40 The building of a conceptual framework, and theory building based on comparison, 
will as a result become almost impossible. Bohannan did not seem to be fully aware of the 
‘comparative’ consequences of his research strategy. In the end this is the result of the fact 
that in his capacity as a legal anthropologist and ethnographer, he might never have been 





In one of his articles Mark Van Hoecke  writes that 
 
the ambition of comparative law has always been to develop some neutral framework, 
some common language with which several legal systems could be described in a way 
accessible to and completely understandable by lawyers belonging to any one of those 
legal systems. We are not discussing here the problems it entails. We wish merely to 
emphasise that some (relatively) neutral, objective, accessible description is a key 
ambition of comparative law.41 
 
In this article I did discus part of the challenge Mark Van Hoecke did not wish to touch upon 
in his 1998 article, by discussing the implications of the debate between Gluckman and 
Bohannan. Regardless of whether we embrace Gluckman’s or Bohannan’s view, the 
comparative lawyer has to realize —and this is a fundamental restriction of every form of 
comparative research— that there are no descriptive terms that are entirely neutral or 
unbiased. So let us now return to the question I posed at the beginning of this chapter: is it 
possible for the legal comparatist to escape the temptation of describing a foreign system in 
terms or categories he thinks he knows or recognizes? The answer is —without a doubt— no. 
However, by now the issue (and the accompanying question) has gained a different identity, 
and is more about whether using legal terminology that is linked to a specific legal system is 
too detrimental to effective or useful legal comparison. I do not think this is necessarily so. 
But doing this necessitates that the researcher should permanently work in a ‘spirit of 
conceptual tentativeness’: the researcher needs to avoid normative preconditions and be 
willing to replace the original conceptual and terminological framework with a better-suited 
                                                          
39 cf JM Donovan, Legal Anthropology (Lanham, AltaMira Press, 2008) 166. 
40 He does appear to be aware of this (although not taking consequences): ‘It seems to me that I did not say 
anything so absurd.’ P Bohannan, ‘Etnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology’ 405. 
41 M. Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New 
Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly  530 (italics added).  
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one42, realizing that whatever terms one uses will inevitably carry traces of the normative 
preoccupations of those who use the natural language from which the terms used derive. As 
with all other classifications, a comparative framework was (and is) always subject to 
correction in the light of better insight. A continuous process of ‘perspective change’ —ie 
‘controlled’ comparison— can ensure that this will actually take place. Neutrality in 
comparative law can than at least be a worthwhile aspiration, even if existing and familiar 
terms are chosen as a means of description. 
 
                                                          
42 M Adams and J Griffiths, ‘Against “Comparative Method”: Explaining Similarities and Differences’’, in M 
Adams and J Bomhoff (eds.), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 2012. 
